Trinity University

Digital Commons @ Trinity
Political Science Faculty Research

Political Science Department

10-1993

Islam vs. Liberalism in Europe
Peter O'Brien
Trinity University, pobrien@trinity.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/polysci_faculty
Part of the Political Science Commons

Repository Citation
O'Brien, P. (1993). Islam vs. liberalism in Europe. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 10(3),
367-381.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at Digital Commons @
Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu.

Islam vs. Liberalism in Europe
Peter O'Brien

Hate is more important for the hater
than the object of his hate.
- Vaclav Havel

Introduction
In the West, Muslilms are regarded with anxiety, mistrust, and fear.
Many of us choose not to travel to Muslim countries for fear of becoming
victims of terrorism. Most westerners worry about the Muslims' finn grip
on the spigot of the world's oil reserves. And in 1991 we convinced our
selves that Saddam Hussein represented a threat on par with Hitler. 1
But Muslims cannot really scare us. After all, it took but a few weeks
to vanquish fully the "Butcher of Baghdad," who had up until that time
the world's fourth largest army. We united in a stalwart international co
alition against the Iraqi menace, while most of Saddam's supposed Arab
allies joined our ranks. We need only to remember the Iran-Iraq war to
console ourselves with the memory of an internecine inter-Muslim
struggle, something not seen in the West since the Second World War.
Granted, each of us can probably recall some personal hardship 1973 and

1979 when the Arabs or Iranians withheld "our'' oil. Now, however, we
all realize, along with such economists as Maddison ( 1 982), that these
embargoes merely exacerbated imminent or existing world recesfilons.
More comfortingly, as Issawi (1982) has shown, the great eastwood
flood of petrodollars in the 1970s was eventually channeled back through
Peter O'Brien is an assistant professor of Political Science at Trinity University, San
Antonio, Texas.
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'For a discussion of the historical and ideological roots of western views on Muslims,
Rodinson (1987) and Said (1978).
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western banks to fuel the economic boom of the following decade. Even
that worst of hostage crises, in Tehran in 1980, ended in the release of all
captives due to the restraint exhibited by the kidnappers and the Iranian
government. Most of our hostages, we must admit, are now back home
safe and sound. These unfortunate events seem rather feeble when com
pared to our proven ability to hold, in effect, all of Iraq hostage, leaving
perhaps as many as three hundred thousand dead before the ordeal ended.
More curiously, Europeans show great concern over the ten million
Muslim migrants residing in their countries. In 1979 and 1980, for ex
ample, German newspapers featured countless exposes and worrisome
editorials about the discovery of some one thousand Qur'an schools in the
Federal Republic. In 1989, the French entangled themselves in a bitter na
tional debate over the refusal of several Muslim girls to abandon their
l;ijiib (head scarves) before entering a public school. At roughly the same
time, the British government felt it necessary to marshal its security
forces to hide and protect a single author-Salman Rushdie-from Mus
lim assasn
si s.
These misgivings see� exaggerated. The Irish Republican Anny daily
threatens the lives of numerous British subjects. Muslim-related distur
bances (i.e., the Turkish-led wildcat strike in Cologne's Ford factory in
1973 or the Paris riots of 1991) have been sporadic and easily quelled.
It would also do well to recall the overwhelming majority of Muslims in
Europe cannot vote. Even if they could, their small numbers preclude any
electoral impact. Moreover, resident aliens are subject to easy deportation
if they act up. And to be sure, those few Muslim girls, just like the pupils
attending Qur'an schools, were merely exercising the right of religious
freedom celebrated and guaranteed in both the French and German consti
tutions.
How do we explain our anxiety? Following Havel's insight, I sug
gest that our fears have much more to do with ourselves than with Mus
lims. In particular, I argue that the perceived standoff with Muslims
makes us doubt the sincerity and supposed superiority of our convictions,
which are predominantly liberal in origin and orientation. The Muslim
critique and rejection of European liberalism lead us to question our most
revered beliefs; we respond by trying to persuade or compel them to em
brace our liberal principles. When they resist, we see no recourse but to
exercise arbitrary power over them. But our liberal tenets offer no con
vincing justification for this. In a sense, we are like the insecure neigh
borhood bully; we do not doubt our capacity to bully our Muslim neigh
bors, but wc have difficulty justifying our behavior to ourselves. We do
not distrust and fear Muslims so much as we distrust and fear ourselves.
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Liberalism Defmed
Liberalism has its roots in the Enlightenment.The core of liberalism
is thus epistemological and ontological, although we now asrociate it with
general political, economic, social, and cultural aspects (i.e., civil liberties

and representative government, free markets, modem and pluralistic so
cieties, and such values as critical reason and tolerance). Its founding
fathers are such great thinkers as Bacon, Newton, Locke, and Descartes,
all of whom made pioneering epistemological and ontological break
throughs. They debunked the arguments and authority of Scholasticism
and demonstrated the pos.5ibility and the superiority of autonomous reason
and scientific inquiry. Each in his own way argued that an individual had
the capacity to reason and thus could fully comprehend his/her world.
Newton's call to understand "Natural Philosophy [and] Mathematical
Principles," Bacon's to "go to the facts for everything," Locke's to "con
sult reason," and Descartes' conclusion that "Cogito, ergo sum" all are
rooted in the belief that the world is intelligible to human beings through

reason.
These and other individuals argued that we can understand our world
as well as know our own best self-interests.It is only our misguided con
ventions, whether custom, coercion, or superstition, that derail the pursuit
of our self-interests. We simply need to have the courage to abandon
these comfortable, but enslaving, conventions. Thus Kant declared the
purpose and challenge of the Enlightenment in this way: "Enlightenment
is man's exodus from his self-incurred tutelage ...dare to know! Have
the courage to use your own understanding; this is the motto of the
Enlightenment" (Friedrich 1949).
Such thinkers believed that knowledge of the natural and the human
worlds was reducible to simple facts and relationships and, therefore,
communicable through unambiguous phrases and principles (expressed
mathematically wherever pos.5ible). Consequently, all persons could
achieve objective knowledge, for it was akin to common sense.Descartes
averred that
Good sense is of all things in the world the most equitably dis
tributed ... the power of judging well and of distinguishing be
tween the true and the false, which, properly speaking, is what is
called good sense, or reason, is by nature equal in all men."
(Smith 1958)
We aS.50Ciate these discoveries with liberalism because they depend
on freedom. Reason must be autonomous and free of superstition. The in-
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stirutions that developed out of the Enlightenment and still characterize
our societies also stress freedom. We espouse free and universal educa
tion so that everyone can exercise his/her capacity to reason. We promote
free markets so that self-knowing human beings can pwsue their own in
terests. We construct free polities with civil liberties and representative
institutions so that all citizens can voice and discuss their concerns.
Tiris concept of free agency lies at the heart of liberalism. It rep
resents not only the normative claim that all human beings should be free,
but also rests on the empirical assertion that free petsons will necessarily
discern and a5.5ent to the truths perceived by these great thinkers. Even
RoU5.5eau's admission that to enlighten human beings would prove to be
quite difficult, and would necessitate forcing them to be free, actually
celebrates freedom, for Emile, once forced to be free, is absolutely certain
of the validity of his learned ways and appreciative of his mentor's com
pulsory methods.
In addition, thinkers of the Enlightenment promised that freedom
would bring progress and power to human beings. Free inquiry and edu
cation would allow scientists to discover the laws of nature and therefore
to control it. Bacon simply equated knowledge and power. Adam Smith
demonstrated that actors in the free market, as if led by an invisible hand,
would naturally enhance its efficiency and order. John Stuart Mill be
lieved that the clash of ideas and opinions made possible by free po�itical
institutions would inevitably produce the best public policy. And Kant
thought that freedom, when coupled with reason, would lead to "the king
dom of ends" and "perpetual peace."
These grand hopes rested on what Spragen.5 (1981) has called "epis
temological manicheanism." According to him, the Enlightenment divided
the world into two realms: the kingdom of coercion, superstition, ignor
ance, self-enslavement-in a word, darkness-and the kingdom of truth,
reason, progress, self-mastery-in a word, light.2 Liberty represented a
kind of bridge from the former to the latter. As such, liberty became vir
tually synonymous with prudence, perfection, and power. Nothing could
prevent free petsons from improving, indeed perfecting, themselves and
their world.
Needless to say, countless subsequent thinkers in our own tradition
have given us cause to question the Enlightenment's unswerving faith in
human sagacity, morality, and progress. Marx exposed the dysfunctions
of the free market. Nietzsche chipped away at, indeed tore down, the
foundations of western science and morality. Shelley depicted the

21

have drawn heavily on this work for the inspiration behind this essay.
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Frankensteinian nightmare of our scientific discoveries. Weber attuned us
to the disenchantment and self-entrapment of our rational, efficient bu
reaucracies. Freud revealed our subliminal irrationalities and discontents.
Orwell shocked us with his demonstration of the abuse and distortion of
language. Joseph Schumpeter portrayed democracy as a political ideology
no different from others used by leaders to sway the masses . And Walter
Lippmann uncovered widespread support for pre-Enlightenment values in
mass public opinion.

I couJd extend the list indefinitely, for many thinkers have pursued,
broadened, and strengthened the unsettling insights of these modem
skeptics and cynics. We live today in what Beck ( 1992) calls the "risk
society." More than at any time in human history, we are sensitive to and
frightened by the risks and dangers created by our own fabrications, be
they nuclear, environmental, genetic, economic, or political. Furtherm.ore,
the ultimate source of our doubts and fears is our own "reflexivity," as
both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991) have pointed oul We have turned
the Enlightenment's most powerful weapon-reason-on the Enlighten
ment itself and used this weapon to doubt and/or discredit our noblest
achievements.
Beck and Giddens also note that most of us resist these conclusions.
Conceding them amounts to recognizing our most cherished values, insti
tutions, and accomplishments as quixotic delusions. Like the Spanish hero
Don Quixote, we find it discomforting and debilitating to gaze into the
mirror. We choose, instead, to gallop onwards with our heads held high
in the self-righteousness. Accordingly, cynics are not our onJy esteemed
thinkers. Many writeis have gained fame and acclaim by protecting the
Enlightenment against its assailants. Naqel, Hempel, and Popper have
redoubled efforts to demonstrate the possibility of objective knowledge
in science. Friedman and Hayek have renewed and reinvigorated faith in
the free market. Rawls and Habermas have redefined and reconfinned
basic Kantian ethics and politics. Each of these men and others like them
staunchly defended human rationality and freedom. For Nagel, Hempel,
and Popper these concepts are vindicated by the exacting methodologist
devoted to verification yet open to falsification; for Friedman and Hayek
by the rational economic individual capable of knowing his/her own in
terests if free to do so; for Rawls and Habennas by the thinking ethical
self free, behind the "veil of ignorance" or in the "ideal speech situation,"
from the contingencies, prejudices, and coercions of history and society.
Most westerners cannot find the time to read and consider these
thoughtful treatises. We therefore look for more obvious and available
confirmations of our beliefs. Perhaps nothing has done more to soothe our
insecurities and affirm our confidence than the collapse of communism
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in the Soviet empire. We like to think that the people of eastern Europe
finally deposed their oppressors because they cherished the same ideals
we hold so dear. The vigorous attempts of the succ�r regimes to seek
our aid and emulate our ways further strengthen our belief in the validity
and superiority of our principles and practices. The relentless campaign
undertaken by our governments to proselytize the "western way of life"
throughout eastern Europe and elsewhere has played, I think, a crucial
role in buttressing our self-confidence, for, as we gain converts to our
faith, we can take solace in the idea that our beliefs represent, at worst,
the best option available and, at best, the universally superior option. We
liberals feed on converts, because the internal logic of liberalism demands
the constant assent of rational free agents.

Muslim Resistance
Muslims attract our attention and antipathy because they refuse to
convert. All across the Arabian peninsula, for instance, we see the per
sistence of monarchies. Moreover, the people living under this vestigial
medieval authority seem to tolerate it. In 1 979, the Iranians overthrew
their westward-looking, modernizing Shah and submitted, in the West's
opinion, to a "regressive" state governed by "antiquated" Islamic law.
Examples of resistance to assimilation are far less dramatic in Europe
but no less apparent. Muslim migrants tend to congregate in ethnic en
claves or ghettos where they reestablish and perpetuate the old customs
of the homeland (Anwar I 979). They form their own exclusive organi
zations that spurn association with non-Muslim groups (Oezcan 1989).
Many Muslims forbid their children to go to public schools or force them
to attend

Qur' an schools where they unlearn what is taught in public

classes (Irskens 1977). The majority of these migrants appear to object to
consorting with or manying westerners, donning western dress, or mas
tering western languages (Abdullah 1981). Everywhere we tum Muslims
are telling us they do not wish to be like us.
But why? We often conveniently point to fanaticism, obscurantism,
and demagoguery. Doubtless Islam has its fair share of fanatics, like any
worldview. Thus some Muslim critics profes.5 apocalyptic visions of im
minent western decline and rnes.5ianic predictions of Muslim ascendancy
(Cemile 1985). We focus on these eccentrics, like the self-styled Turkish
prophet Cemalettin Kaplan in Cologne (Stern 1987), because we wish to
ignore more thoughtful and penetrating critics. Given our liberal presump
tions, the idea of a reasoned yet resolute rejection of liberalism strikes us
as oxymoronic and thus impossible.
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Islamic critiques of western liberalism, generally speaking, can be
divided into two sorts. The first underscores western hypocrisy; West
erners refuse to extend or guarantee to Muslims the same basic rights and
privileges that all human beings deserve. Muslim authors often rail
against the erroneous image of Islam promoted by the western media and
anchored in popuJar opinion. They complain that Europeans fail to apply
their much touted reason, open-mindedness, and tolerance when evaluat
ing Islam. For example, few Europeans object when nuns choose to wear
a habit as an expression of their piety or to live segregated in convents.
But when Muslim women cover their heads with scarves or their bodies
with nonrevealing gannents, or refuse to participate in activities invo:Jving
men, westerners cry "patriarchy," "domination," and "injustice." In the
early 1980s, the government of Northrhine-Westfalen resolved to provide
Islamic religious instruction in the public schools, but then went on to es
tablish a commission of Christian theologians to draft the curriculum.
Muslim organizations vehemently opposed the plans, arguing that Chris
tians wouJd never tolerate a Christian curricuJum written by Muslims.
Similarly, whereas Muslims recognize Christianity as a legitimate faith,
only the Roman Catholic Church, not the evangelical churches, has recip
rocated such a recognition. Furthennore, the Federal RepubHc of Ger
many has declared the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches "recog
nized reHgions"-a legal status that entitles them to significant financial
assistance from the state. Yet it has not done the same for Islam, despite
its roughly two mi!Uon adherents in Germany. In the words of the Is
lamische FOderation in Berlin (1986):
If we in Berlin are to fashion our future together, then it does not
suffice to support the justified demands of the black population
in South Africa; it is far more necessary to support these free
doms and rights in Berlin itself, and for all of the faithful.3

On the other hand, Europeans have exhibited respect and sympathy
for such criticisms. In Holland and Sweden, for example, Muslim mi
grants have been accorded the right to vote in local elections. In Ger
many, the Green Party has proposed enactment of a "right to settle" that
would grant resident aliens all of the rights of citizenship without re
quiring naturalization. In France, S.O.S. Racisme has doggedly spoken
out against various forms of discrimination. In most European polities,
Muslims have won important court cases to protect their civil liberties

3This entire document is a persuasive example of the critique of European hypocrisy.
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(Th.r8nhardt 1986). Cries of hypocrisy gain limited sympathy because
they, in effect, demand that liberal values be applied to Muslims.
Criticisms of the second sort are far more threatening, for they
generally follow the same line of argument proffered by the West's own
skeptics and cynics.They contend that the free market has not liberated
human beings; it has rather enslaved them to the machine, consumerism,
and raw materialism. Moreover, liberal ethics have hardly produced

so

cieties characterized by perpetual peace. Violence, aggression, exploita
tion and alienation run rampant in western societies. "It must be regret
tably acknowledged," concluded one critic, "that Western civilisation's
shortcomings and weaknesses are no fewer than its advantages . . .
despite the new pages of history turned, human happiness has not in
c reased nor have social ills diminished." (Lari 1977)
These problems persist, moreover, not because the liberal project has
yet to be completed, but because its underlying assumptions are pro
foundly flawed. Liberal tenets cannot stand up to "logical scrutiny." As
a result,
modem man, more than any of his predecessors, can construct
man, but knows less than any of them what it is he is construct
ing ...these new ideologies ...fall short of answering basic
human needs and . : . they either lead people to a sense of
futility, or draw them into bondage.(Shari 'ati 1980)
Such writers do not always reserve their criticism for the West; in
deed, many have led efforts to reveal and reform the shortcomings of Is
lamic civilization itself.4 But they aim to disabuse their readers of the
urge to romanticize and emulate western liberalism, which, they insist, of
fers no indisputably superior answers for humanity. Look to your own
tradition for answers, they implore.5

Liberalizing Muslims
We choose not to see or hear these reasoned critiques of liberalism.
We believe that the logic of liberalism teaches that free and rational
thinking

perforce

culminates

in

the

acceptance, not

rejection, of

4For a description of the longstanding internal debates about the strengths and
weaknesses of Islamic principles and practices, see Voll (1982).

-'1b.is theme is stressed, for instance, in the second paragraph of the preamble to the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
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liberalism. In response, we -focus attention on the varied forces that
allegedly obstruct the Muslims' way of reasoning. The social scientific
analyses of the situation of Muslim communities in Europe has produced
a voluminous literature. Since roughly the late 1960s, European govem
ments have commissioned thousands of these studies.6 Despite the glut of
such research, however, most of it contains a common theme-the experi
ence of migrating from traditional (Muslim) to modem (westem) societies
inevitably causes rapid and disorienting change. In other words, trans
planted virtually overnight from village to metropolis, they find adjust
ment to the pace and demands of modem life difficult and threatening.
They cling to their traditions (be they the patriarchal family, outdated reli
gious precepts, or authoritarian political beliefs) in a fruitless attempt to
escape or slow change and its corrosive consequences. Stubborn adher
ence to tradition, in the words of one Gennan analyst,
should not be understood as a natural continuation of the lifestyle
in the homeland, rather as a defense against the changed environ
ment. The confrontation with the divergent ways of the surround
ing world creates in every case a sense of uncertainty, a strain o n
the personality. [This leads] t o signs of retreat and compensation,
such as exaggeration of traditional norms and values, idealizing
the homeland, avoidance of contact with the German envitron
ment. (Neumann 1980)
These defensive reactions are not "natural," according to western
analysts. Muslims are thus typically diagnosed as suffering from various
psychological and social disorders, including "anomie," "anxiety," "culture
shock," "identity confusion," "fragmentation of the self-image," "deficient
self-confidence," "deficient ego identity," "psychic overload," or "socio
cultural stress." Moreover, these symptoms cause such unnatural and de
viant behaviors: resignation, escapism, excessive consumption, aggression,
crime, and extremism (Ronneberger 1977; Albrecht and Pfeiffer 1979).
Such analyses essentially divide Muslims and Europeans into two
distinct classes of actors. Europeans are assumed to be free agents who
employ reason to act naturally and normally, while Muslims, by contrast,
are depicted as irrational and not (yet) free to think or act reasonably.
These studies ignore the political, cultural, and racial distinctions between
Muslims and Europeans; rather they concentrate on a more palatable epis
temological distinction. In a nutshell, we do not view and treat Muslims

6

See, for instance, the four-hundred-page bibliography in Gliedner-Simon (1986).
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differently because they hold foreign passports, believe in a different God,
come from non-European stock, or even have darker complexions-they
simply have not had the opportunity to reason freely.
Both the liberal diagnosis and distinction detennine the solution to the
Muslim problem. The West's goal becomes clear: to liberate and en
lighten the Muslim population. For sociologists, this usually means re
ducing or eliminating the social inequalities that keep Muslims living in
Europe in a state of marginalization and underpivilege. Such authors pre
scribe social programs designed to provide Muslims opportunities in
housing, education, and employment equal to those enjoyed by Europeans
(Hoffman-Nowotny and Hondrich 1982). For psychologists and peda
gogues, the cure involves resocializing Muslims (usually the young ones
whose minds are still malleable) to the modem liberal values prevalent
in the West. Accordingly, they endorse programs that fully absorb and in
tegrate Muslim pupils into the public educational system.
Such prescriptions aim to make Muslims more "like us," either by
giving them the same opportunities (or freedoms) we have or by instruct
ing them in our ways. Such proposals view Muslims not as human
beings, but as human matter to be molded after our own image; they are
grounded in the belief that Muslims will embrace our ways once they are
given the opportunities, resources, and assistance to do so. Thus the Ger
man sociologist Esser (1980) predicts that integrated foreigners eventually
will assimilate the modem norms and values that maintain "system equi
librium" in the Federal Republic. Even proposals for "multicultural educa
tion," which integrate Muslim beliefs and experiences into the general
curriculum, ultimately seek to inculcate classic Enlightenment values i n
Muslim and European pupils. Proponents o f multicultural education argue
that it "dismantles prejudices and nationalisms, facilitates tolerance for the
strange and different, and awakens empathy for the situation of 'the
other' rather than competitiveness" (Essinger and Hellmich 1981).
These analyses and proposals have not gone unheeded. The govern
ments of European countries with large migrant populations launched and
sustained extensive campaigns to integrate migrants into the mainstream
of society throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Comprehensive social welfare
programs were expanded to include resident aliens as well as citizens.
Special housing, language, and vocational and cultural programs were
devised to as.5ist foreigners in their adjustment to western life. Educa
tional programs were aimed at making second-generation migrants into
equal citizens by the time they reach maturity (Thriinhardt 1986). One
study likened these efforts to the development of an entirely new "in
dustry" replete with products and specialists, research and degrees, insti
tutes and agencies, marketers and salespersons (Griese 1984).
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In my opinion. such initiatives tend to depoliticize relations between
Muslims and Europeans. Generally speaking. they assist but do not em
power their subjects. Muslim migrants enjoy the right to vote or run for
public office in only a few European lands. Consequently, they are ex
cluded from participating in the design of programs and policies aimed
at them. More importantly. this critical division of labor and power rests
on

epistemological, rather than political, assumptions and justifications.

Europeans vest themselves with the authority to act on and for Muslims
on the basis of their liberal understanding that they know, better than the
Muslims themselves, what is best for the newcomers. European policy
makers act as the self-appointed doctors and therapists of Muslims rather

than their politically chosen representatives. When it comes to Muslims,
therefore, Europeans excuse themselves from the political accountability
they demand in their own relation.5.
Muslims find themselves entrapped in an apolitical Catch-22 common
to all technocratic projects. If they accept the European assistance, they
in effect assent to the image of themselves as nonreasoning nonliberals
in need of European aid and instruction. If they resist or insist that they
are being coerced into integrative programs, such recalcitrance is taken
as yet another symptom of their ailment and, therefore, grounds for fur
ther treatment. To be sure, the logic of liberalism does not allow for a
free and reasoned critique or rejection of the liberal order and its under
lying axioms. Only free and rational agents deserve the political rights as
sociated with liberalism; irrational actors require liberation from their ir
rational tutelage. And as self-styled western liberals we see it as our right
and duty to be the Muslims' liberators.

Arbitrary and Nonliberal Recourses
The problem with MU5lims residing in Europe is that they refuse to
be liberated. First and foremost, they demand political rights so that they
themselves can determine what is best for them. When the Muslim girls
showed up at school wearing the /Jijiib, they were insisting on their right
to free worship as well as the right to resist or reject the teachings of
French public schools. Turkish parents make a similar political statement
when they whisk their children off to Qur'an schools immediately follow
ing German classes. Countless Islamic organizations in Europe refuse to
participate in official programs of integration, even if it means forfeiting
much-needed public assistance. For instance, mosques in Europe typically
offer their visitors much more than a place of worship; they also provide
an

array of social services parallel to but independent of those offered by

European governments (V0cking 1984).
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Such acts of resistance trouble and alarm us, for they seem to snub
our generous attempts to offer the fruits of liberalism. Unlike their
brothers and sisters in faraway places who might not yet be sufficiently
exposed to liberal values or assistance, Muslims in Europe eschew liberal
ism despite its ready availability. Nothing perturbs and perplexes Euro
peans as much as the documented tendency among Muslim migrants to
resist naturalization. Schemes have been devised to offer migrants the
chance to become citizens of their host societies. Most involve liberaliz
ing the requirements for naturalization for second-generation aliens, who
are perceived as the most willing and able to assimilate western norms
and values. They also entail swearing an oath of allegiance to the liberal
principles enunciated in European constitutions once young migrants
reach adulthood. The policies assume that after living in the West from
an early age and being socialized in public schools, western-educated
Muslims will seek citizenship and embrace the values it embodies.

Our liberal logic has not prepared us for the fact that Muslims will
not take the oath. We believe that free, rational adults will by nature as
sent to liberalism, and that because liberal societies are justly constructed
and organized, they are worthy of the approval of free and rational per
sons. If we take Muslims seriously, we must face the prospect that liberal
principles and practices engender discontent and disapproval. Moreover,
if we admit that Muslims are free and rational agents, we must conclude,
from their rejection, that they perhaps know something about liberalism
that has escaped our scrutiny. And this, in tum, would suggest that our
own acceptance of liberalism has not been as free or rational as we think.
Rather than recognize these unsettling possibilities, we choose to per
sist in the belief that Muslims' troubles Lie with themselves rather than
with us. We conclude that the antiquated customs and mores they bring
with them from their homelands are more firmly rooted than originally
conceived. As a result, their misfortune is greater than expected. We see
no option but to judge the differences between us and them as en
trenched, perhaps immutable. In this way, Muslims come to be viewed
as external agitators-foreign threats in our midst whose alien naiture runs
far deeper than the possession of a different passport. As many post
structuralists note, the sense of difference and "otherness" we fed towards
Muslims stems more from the subjective image we wish to have of our
selves than from objective attributes common to Muslims (Said 1978).
But we resolve, then, that their misfortune should not become our
misfortune.7 We can and must endeavor to reform them. If they resist re-

'I have borrowed this idea from Honig (1991).
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fortn, we must limit or eliminate their widesirable influences on our
societies. Accordingly, after roughly two decades of progressive and in
tegrative legislation, we see throughout Europe in the late 1980s and early
1990s mounting calls and sympathies for tougher, more restrictive poli
cies towards Muslim and other non-European migrants and refugees. The
European Community, for instance, has initiated steps to "harmonize" the
laws governing political asylum in member states in the hope of prevent
ing refugees from trying their luck from one country to the next. Pro
posals have been submitted to institute "immigration quotas" that would
place a ceiling on the number of immigrants and, in some cases, desig
nate the countries from which immigrants would be accepted. The fact
that xenophobic parties, like the National Front in France, or the Repub

licans in Gennany, have made significant gains throughout Europe in

re

cent elections reinforces such trends.
Such restrictive proposals and policies all blame migrants and absolve
Europeans of responsibility for the problems associated with large-scale
migration. Calls to limit immigration have typically been justified on the
grounds that Europeans cannot possibly absorb all of the world's poor
and persecuted. In other words, the problems of the Third World are
simply too complex and intractable to be solved by an open-door policy
for refugees. Moreover, Europe has its own problems, particularly now
as

western Europeans have taken on the responsibility aiding their eastern

European neighbors in the transition from dictatorship to democracy. For
example, in response to neo-Nazi disturbances in such cities as Rostock,
Christian Democrats reconfirmed and Social Democrats conceded to the
German government's plan to stem the tide of immigration into the newly
united country. In

so

doing, the parties effectively claimed that both the

cause of and the responsibility for the disturbances lie not with the neo
Nazis but with the foreigners, whose numbers have grown beyond ac
ceptability. Perhaps this also explains the limited, and at times reluctant,
police protection given to the victims of neo-Nazi terror-as well as the
lenient sentences handed out lo the convicted perpetrators.
Such acts trouble our conscience and offend our sensibilities because
we see no viable alternative yet cannot justify them with our liberal
convictions. We have been taught that the only effective and ethical way
to

deal with nonliberals is to liberalize them. Moreover, the liberal para

digm has assured us that all human beings by nature possess the capacity
and desire to become liberals when free to do so. Coercion should play
no role. Our societies are self-governing and self-legitimating.
When the liberal cure fails to heal our social wounds, however, we
find no choice but to accept the older idea that Muslims and Europeans
have immutable and insurmountable differences. Yet it is precisely these
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kinds of irrational and arbitrary distinctions, whether religious, racial, na
tionalist, or ethnic, that liberalism was supposed to overcome and trans
cend. When we cannot convince Muslims of the universality of our
liberal views of human nature and morality, we see no recourse but to
discipline and coerce them. Such tactics and rationales, which belong to
a preliberal era, force us to acknowledge, uncomfortably, that we are less
liberal than we believe. After all, is there a genuine philosophical or ethi
cal difference between the policies of liberal governments that discourage
the entrance and encourage the exit of Muslims, and the slogans of the
National Front or Republican Party that France exists for the French and
that Germany exists for the Germans? The only difference lies in the fact

that the xenophobes feel perfectly "j ustified in bullying Muslims, whereas
we do not. This, more than anything else, explains why the Muslim pre
sence in Europe causes us so much anxiety.
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